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Introduction 
The opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU) in 2014, 
fuelled the debate over whether the European Union (hereinafter EU) should accede the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR).
1
 It suggested that the 
accession will undermine the autonomy of EU Law and the CJEU. But, the need for the 
reform of the human rights mechanism in Europe has been highlighted on several 
occasions over the past few decades. The accession of the EU to the ECHR will establish 
a balance between the different areas of law for all EU member states.
2
 One such affected 
area will be the protection of human rights amidst environmental challenges. The 
increasing case law on environmental rights by the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter ECtHR) and the CJEU, shows that there is still room for policy development 
in the area of ‘environmental rights’. The accession of the EU to the ECHR could be the 
answer to the protection of rights affected by environmental challenges, benefiting from 
the authority of the CJEU over EU Environmental Law and the extensive case law of the 
ECtHR on environment related applications. This will maintain a balance between the 
environmental policies of the EU and the commitments for a uniform human rights 
protection mechanism provided by the Council of Europe.  
The article discusses the relationship between the two courts, as well as the 
development of human rights in the European communities. It examines the case law on 
‘environmental rights’ of the CJEU and the ECtHR questioning their respective capacity 
to decide over such cases. It will be argued that application of EU environmental law and 
the external ‘specialist’ supervisory role of the ECtHR, would offer a more 
comprehensive form of protection of human rights affected by environmental challenges.  
 
Reliance and hierarchy between the two Courts 
The creation of what would later become the European Union (hereinafter EU), was 
primarily an economic endeavor, with little interest in the protection of human rights.
3
 In 
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this respect, the EU does not have a complete human rights policy.
4
 The EU 
progressively promoted itself as an ‘ethical power’ with a renewed interest in ensuring 
the protection of human rights amongst Member States.
5
 However, the ability of the 
CJEU to decide over human rights claims has been repeatedly questioned.
6
 The 
developing human rights jurisprudence of the CJEU, as well as the challenges Solange I 
posed for the CJEU by the German Constitutional Court, generated the necessity for the 
EU’s accession to the ECHR.
7
 Despite the more favorable decision in Solange II, the first 
decision was considered a strike against the CJEU, since it is an implicit declaration of an 
inefficacy in protecting the human rights of citizens of Member States.
8
  It was then 
thought that the accession of the EU to the ECHR would have brought to an end the 
uncertainty of Member States of whether the CJEU efficiently protected human rights. 
 In 1974, the CJEU in Nöld v Commission accepted that the EU should follow the 
provisions of the ECHR as guidelines for human rights protection.
9
 In the same spirit, in 
Rutili v French Minister of the Interior, the CJEU referred to the provisions of the ECHR 
in regards to the control of aliens.
10
 The CJEU in both these cases gave an indication of 
reliance on the provisions of the ECHR making it clear that this was the first reference 
point for the protection of human rights in Member States. The CJEU later clarified that 
It is settled case-law that where, as in the main proceedings, a national 
situation falls within the scope of Community law and a reference for a 
preliminary ruling is made to the Court, it must provide the national courts 
with all the criteria of interpretation needed to determine whether that 
situation is compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which 
the Court ensures and which derive in particular from the ECHR.
11
 
In relation to the ECtHR, there is a clear indication of an unwillingness to decide on 
potential human rights violations by the EU Institutions. Although Costello suggested 
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that the ECtHR has analysed actions of Member States following EU law,
12
 in the case of 
Matthews v UK, in their joint dissenting opinion, Judges Sir John Freeland and Jungwiert 
expressed their concern over the ECtHR deciding a case involving the acts of the EU 
Institutions.
 13
 In the case of Senator Lines GmbH, the applicant relying on Matthews v 
UK, claimed that the Court should be able to rule over the compatibility of the actions of 
EC Institutions with the ECHR provisions. To support this, the Council of the Bars and 
Law Societies of the European Union asserted that:  
[T]he absence of access to the European Court of Human Rights, taken 
together with the absence of any standing in general for private individuals to 




This is true in the event that an individual brings an application against an EU institution 
interfering with human rights, or a Member State which following EU policy interferes 
with human rights, since the EU has not acceded the ECHR. For example, implementing 
EU policy for environmental protection may affect the right to property provided by the 
ECHR. The accession of the EU to the ECHR will allow individuals to bring applications 
before the ECtHR against EU Institutions as well as EU Member States.  
A chronology of accession  
The idea of the EU acceding the Convention goes back to the early stages of designing 
European integration.
15
 There was an obvious willingness on the part of the European 
Commission to proceed with such a development. This arguably silenced the criticisms 
over the alleged focus of the CJEU towards economic interests rather than human 
rights.
16
 The European Commission maintained this positive approach that this would 
enhance human rights protection in Europe and preserve the common cultural heritage of 
                                                 
12 C. Costello, ‘The Bosphorus ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: fundamental rights and 
blurred boundaries in Europe’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 87 See M. & Co. v Federal Republic of 
Germany App no 13258/87 (Commission Decision, 9 February 1990) and Karl Eckart Heinz v the 
Contracting States party to the European Patent Convention insofar as they are High Contracting Parties to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom App no 21090/92 (Commission Decision, 10 January 1994) 
13 Matthews v UK App no 24833/94 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999). See also C. Rieder, ‘Protecting Human 
Rights Within the European Union: Who is Better Qualified to Do the Job—the European Court of Justice 
or the European Court of Human Rights?’ (2005) 20 Tul. Eur. & Civ. LF 80 
14 Senator Lines GmbH v Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom App no 56672/00 (ECtHR, 
10 March 2004) The submissions of the third parties. 
15 J. P. Jacqué, ‘The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms’ (2011) 48 CML Rev. 995, on the 1953 ad hoc assembly of the European Coal and 
Steel Community 
16 S. Douglas-Scott, ‘A tale of two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the growing European Human 
Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 CML Rev. 650 
 
 
(Western) European countries, ultimately serving democracy.
17
 In 1990, the European 
Commission observed that the gap between the mechanisms of human rights protection 
between the EU Member States and the EU itself could be eliminated by a possible 
accession of the EU to the ECHR.
18
  
 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty,
19
 the CJEU repeatedly mentioned the provisions of the 
ECHR. This intended to eliminate the gaps that could be created through the different 
case-law of the two courts and ensure uniformity of human rights protection. ‘The Court 
of Justice of the European Union has used the European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence as an interpretative tool with respect to the lawfulness of acts and 
omissions of EU institutions and organs.’
20
 The mention of the ECHR provisions by the 
CJEU does not imply that it is bound by the ECtHR case-law. It simply means that the 
mention of the case law and the ECHR’s provisions alongside other international 
instruments, serves as a point of reference on human rights protection. The Treaty of 
Lisbon while proclaiming the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding and through 
Article 6(1) and Article 6(2) provided that ‘[t]he Union shall accede to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such 
accession will not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties’.
21
 Article 6 
illustrates a desire to ensure a uniform protection of human rights across Europe.  
 There is evidence of the CJEU’s resistance to the notion of the accession since the 
early stages of the accession discussion. The CJEU held in 1996 that taking into account 
the circumstances at the time, the Union did not have the competence to accede to the 
ECHR. By examining the possibility of accession under Article 235 (now Article 308) of 
the EC Treaty, the CJEU concluded that the Article did not confer for such widening of 
the Union’s functions, therefore, the Article could not be interpreted as providing for an 
accession to the ECHR.
22
 
 Currently, the common Member States of the Union and the Council of Europe, 
implementing EU law in their domestic systems, are also bound by the provisions of the 
ECHR. In the event of a fulfilment of the accession, human rights protection across 
Europe would be strengthened. According to Howells 
Firstly, accession would ensure that, in addition to the Charter’s internal 
protection, an external judicial review by the Strasbourg Court of human 
rights protection is assured. Secondly, with the Convention becoming legally 
binding upon the Union, any potential divergences between fundamental 
rights and rights protected by the Convention can be prevented. Thirdly, EU 
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citizens would finally be able to bring cases against the organs of the EU 
directly to the Strasbourg Court.
23
 
 The most simplified mapping of how the accession will affect the relationship 
between the two courts, suggests that whether proceedings should be brought against a 
Member State or against the EU, depends on the discretion of member states on how to 
implement EU law,
24
 and whether the potential violation derives from the implementation 
strategy of EU law itself. When in doubt, the ECtHR should make that decision.
25
   
 The Draft Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 2011, stated that the 
accession of the EU to the Convention would serve the enhancement of human rights 
protection in Europe.
26
 Article 1(2)(c) provides that  
Accession to the Convention and the Protocols thereto shall impose on the 
European Union obligations with regards only to acts, measures or omissions 
of its institutions, bodies, office or agencies, or of persons acting on their 
behalf. Nothing in the Convention or the Protocol thereto shall require the 
European Union to perform an act or adopt a measure for which it has no 
competence under European Union law.  
Following the Draft Agreement, the CJEU opinion raised concerns relating mostly to the 
protection of the CJEU’s autonomy.
27
 Firstly, although there is nothing to forbid the 
external control that will be afforded following the accession, and subject to this not 
affecting the autonomy of the EU legal order, the judgment of Melloni suggested that 
national standards of human rights protection should not affect the level of protection 
provided by the Charter.
28
 This runs contrary to Article 53 of the ECHR, which allows 
Member States to provide higher standards of protection than those provided by the 
ECHR. To eliminate this clash of provisions, the CJEU suggested that Article 53 ECHR 
and Article 53 of the Charter should be coordinated to ensure that the autonomy of the 
EU legal order is not compromised.
29
 Secondly, and in the same spirit of fear over the 
future autonomy of EU law, the CJEU suggested that the principle of mutual trust 
amongst EU Member States would be compromised given that the EU will be a member 
of the ECHR in the same position as Contracting States which are not EU Member States 
and not part of this principle.
30
  Thirdly, the CJEU identified a potential clash between 
the system provided by Protocol No 16 ECHR and Article 267 TFEU of preliminary 
rulings. This would adversely impact on the autonomy of the preliminary ruling 
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 Fourthly, the draft agreement allows for the EU and Member States to bring 
an application under Article 33 of the ECHR before the ECtHR against another Member 
State or the EU. According to the CJEU, this would undermine the objective of Article 
344 TFEU.
32
 Fifthly, the co-respondent mechanism allowed by Article 3(5) of the Draft 
Agreement, was challenged due to the competence of the ECtHR to invite or extend an 
invitation to a contracting Party, capable of ‘[interfering’ with the division of powers 
between the EU and its Member States’.
33
 Sixthly, the CJEU suggested that the prior 
involvement procedure undermines the characteristics of the EU and EU law, since the 
CJEU will not be allowed to rule on the interpretation of an EU provision.
34
 Finally, the 
CJEU recognised that the Draft Agreement shows disregard towards the ‘specific 
characteristics of EU law’ in relation to judicial review in Common Foreign and Security 
Policy matters.
35
  The Opinion was not immune to criticism. Isiksel argues that the CJEU 
is overconfident that the EU has risen above any ‘political or institutional defects’ that 
could lead to violations of human rights. Such overconfidence is a reason to demand that 
the CJEU is kept under ‘checks and balances’.
36
 Coming under the external control of a 
‘human rights specialist’ ECtHR will serve legal certainty rather than undermine EU 
autonomy.
37
 A coherent approach to human rights protection in Europe is necessary, 
given how the EU through the Copenhagen criteria requires the ratification of the ECHR 
therefore recognising the significance of the framework.
38
 
 ‘Environmental rights’ before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
Prior to the enactment of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the CJEU created a list 
of rights that reflected the commitment of the EU to human rights protection. The ECtHR 
through its jurisprudence and its interpretation of the ECHR’s articles, offered guidelines 
to the CJEU on deciding human rights cases. This relationship between the two Courts is 
present after the enactment of the EU Charter as well. Initially the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was only used as a point of reference. When the Lisbon Treaty was 
enacted in 2009, it was given the same legally binding status as the Treaties.
39
 It imposes 
obligations on the institutions of the European Union for human rights protection, and not 
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on its member states.
40
 The Charter is considered a modern instrument for human rights 
protection addressing issues of bioethics as well as sustainable development. This comes 
as no surprise considering the time of its creation, and the general knowledge and 
technological advancement witnessed since the creation of the ECHR. Comparing the 
Charter to the ECHR and taking into account the time gap separating their creations, the 
Charter may seem like the most appropriate instrument for addressing ‘environmental 
rights’ issues, since the demand for the protection of environmental rights has emerged 
more recently.  
 Currently a combination of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU 
Environmental law is used to protect combined interests at an EU level. Although, the 
efficacy of the CJEU in deciding over human rights matters has been challenged in the 
past,
41
 the CJEU has decided cases raising environmental and human rights concerns. 
These cases are mostly based on the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
(hereinafter Aarhus Convention), which explicitly provides for the protection of 
procedural rights concerning environmental protection.
42
 ‘Procedural environmental 
rights’ as provided by the Aarhus Convention implemented by directives and the CJEU 
through the procedure of the preliminary rulings, were expected to be protected when 
enforcing EU Environmental Law.
43
  
 The overall approach of the CJEU towards human rights affected by 
environmental challenges cannot be considered as satisfactory, so as to assume that there 
is no need for a development in the area.  In the case of Seaport (NI) Ltd, the Advocate 
General stated in his advisory opinion that Article 37 of the EU Charter, as well as 
Article 174 of the EC Treaty, provide for everyone’s right to live in an ‘environment 
suitable for ensuring their health and well-being’,
44
 associating environmental protection 
with human rights by way of interpreting the Articles.
45
 The AG connected the article to 
the Aarhus Convention, emphasising the importance of safeguarding procedural rights in 
order to protect substantive rights to the environment. The Advocate General’s opinion in 
Commission v Italy was in the same spirit.
46
 Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
pointed out that Article 37 of the EU Charter sets out responsibilities that the EU and its 
Member States have to fulfil in achieving an environment of quality. In a case involving 
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procedural rights, the Advocate General emphasised the importance of assessing 
environmental effects of all projects, and the disclosure of all the relevant information 
about the procedure of assessment.
47
  
 In relation to procedural rights, the Greenpeace case raises a vital issue for the 
protection of rights linked to the protection of the environment; the protection of the right 
to receive information on projects affecting the environment. This right is also covered by 
the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.
48
 The Aarhus Convention has been a point of 
reference in resolving the issue of locus standi before the CJEU since its jurisprudence 
indicates that NGOs could not bring cases before it. The reluctance to apply the Aarhus 
Convention suggests that the CJEU is even less likely to act decisively to protect 
substantive environmental rights, especially in the absence of any explicit protection in 
EU law. It has been also argued that: ‘The ECJ is likely to find itself increasingly called 
upon to achieve a balance between two of the Union’s objectives: economic development 
and environmental protection’.
49
 The capacity of the CJEU to protect human rights has 
been repeatedly called into question. The accession will allow the ECHR to ‘supervise’ 
the EU when it comes to human rights issues. As Thorbjørn Jargland said, the accession 
‘will contribute to the creation of single space, putting in place the missing link in the 
European system of fundamental rights protection’.
50
 Therefore, the ECtHR should be the 
responsible court for protecting ‘environmental rights’, since it focuses on people’s rights 
rather than economic interests. The Draft Agreement on the Accession of the European 
Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
shows a shift from an intention to accede to the ECHR to the creation of the relevant 
framework in order for the EU to accede to the ECHR.  
‘Environmental rights’ in the European Court of Human 
Rights 
Contrary to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ECHR does not include a 
consideration of environmental factors. Thus, the existing wording of the ECHR was 
interpreted in order to decide on these applications. These were interpreted to reflect 
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mostly rights relevant to health risks and the access to environmental information.
51
 The 
ECtHR was by no means progressive. Since 1969 when Dr S. v the Federal Republic of 
Germany was heard in the European Commission of Human Rights, the ECtHR has taken 
very slow steps in recognising that firstly, the quality of the environment can affect one’s 
private and family life,
52
 and that there is a need for people to be informed over the 
quality of their environment.
53
 There was more willingness to address these claims under 
Article 8 – Right to Private and Family Life rather than Article 2 – Right to Life, even in 
cases of severe health impairment. The wording of the Article 8 allowed for maintaining 
a fair balance between individual rights and the community’s interests as a whole. This 
balance was of great relevance when it came to weighing environmental protection and 
protection of human rights against economic growth. Article 8 also accommodates 
positive obligations towards protecting the rights against environmentally hazardous 
circumstances.
54
 The ECtHR drawing inspiration from the Aarhus Convention, identified 
within the ECHR’s provisions a positive obligation to provide information on 




  In addition, the ECtHR’s favouring of a wide margin of appreciation to states in 
cases under Article 8, is of great significance. The ECtHR has mentioned that national 
courts are generally in a better position to assess whether a said action was necessary for 
the wellbeing of a state, whether this leads to a better protected environment or not.
56
 
This has allowed Member States to choose whether environmental pollution was allowed 
in order to protect economic interests, or to allow interference with individual rights in 
order to protect the environment.
57
 The difficulties over protecting human rights to the 
environment with the current form of the ECHR are evident from the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. The case of Otgon v Republic of Moldova shows the variation of 
interpretations -lack of uniformity- of Article 8 on issues of risks to health caused by 
environmental pollution.
58
 The applicant claimed that the compensation offered to her 
family for the physical and mental damage suffered following the consumption of 
contaminated water, was not enough. The ECtHR decided that the compensation offered 
for a found violation of Article 8 was disproportionate to the harm suffered, leading to a 
violation of her right to private and family life, ‘since her physical integrity has been 
affected by an unhealthy environment’.
59
 The dissenting opinion criticises the connection 
of health risks to Article 8, a long-lasting issue with the ECtHR’s approach to 
environmental concerns. According to Judge Lemmens ‘any damage to a person’s health 
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[does not] attract the applicability of Article 8. For that provision to be applicable, there 
should be repercussions on the affected person’s private life’.60  
This is in direct contrast with the ECtHR’s approach to previous cases of risks to 
health and its possible link to Article 8 rather than Article 2. One would recall the 
concurring opinion of Judge Jambrek in Guerra v Italy, where it was highlighted that it 
was time for the ECtHR to evolve and interpret Article 2, rather than the applied Article 
8, to include different situations of risk against life, other than those initially intended to 
tackle.
61
 In 1998, Judge Jambrek asked for a wider interpretation of Article 2, in order to 
include health impairment and risk to life caused by environmental pollution. In 2016 
Judge Lemmens, asked for a more ‘restrained approach to the scope of application of 
Article 8’.
62
 The uncertainty over which Article is better suited for protecting health 
amidst environmental challenges, is evidence of the need for an explicit protection of 
rights when these are affected by environmental degradation.   
 The differential application of different ECHR articles is similarly observed on 
the issue of risks to possessions by environmental challenges as well. The applicants in 
Öneryildiz successfully claimed a violation of their rights under Articles 8 and 1 of 
Protocol 1 for the loss of their movable property during a methane explosion, for which 
they did not receive compensation. In this case, the applicants lived in a slum quarter in a 
refuse-tip illegally. Although the ECtHR accepted that the house was built illegally, the 
structure, fittings and fixtures represented significant economic interest and came under 
the protection of Article 1 of Protocol 1.
63
 The government submitted that compensation 
for lost property which was illegally erected on public land, would amount to a reward 
for acting unlawfully. Nevertheless, the ECtHR revisited the meaning of ‘possessions’ 
within the wording of Article 1 of Protocol 1, to include ‘a reasonable and “legitimate 
expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right’.
64
 The ECtHR 
concluded that failure to act in order to protect the applicants’ possessions from a 
methane explosion, was a violation of the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
The destruction of property through an environmental disaster would come under the 
spectrum of Article 1 of Protocol 1, while Article 8 was not separately examined. This 
decision is a puzzling one, given how the property was erected illegally, and the applicant 
was fully aware of the status of this property.  
 This is more evident when comparing Öneryildiz to Depalle v France. In the 
latter case, a retired couple bought a property on the beach which included a house and a 
dyke built illegally 100 years before.
65
 The State served a notice requiring the demolition 
of the house and restoring the area to its original state without receiving compensation. 
The argument was that the house obstructed the right of access to public maritime 
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property and was contrary to national laws related to the protection of coastal areas.
66
 The 
applicants claimed a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 relying on the definition of 
“possessions” given in Öneryildiz
 67
 
The concept of ‘possessions’ … is not limited to the ownership of physical 
goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law… 
The concept of ‘possessions’ is not limited to ‘existing possessions’ but may 
also cover assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can 
argue that he has at least a reasonable and legitimate expectation of obtaining 
effective enjoyment of a property right.68 
Although the house was bought in good faith, the ECtHR decided that there was no 
violation of the right to enjoyment of property. The outcome of the fair balance test was 
favourable towards the State and the State had a duty to control the use of property if this 
satisfied a legitimate aim.
69
 The fact that no compensation was offered, was not 
considered by the ECtHR as a reason for a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1. Judge 
Casadevall, in his concurring opinion, stated that although ‘possessions’ as a concept 
includes the expectation of enjoying these possessions, Article 1 of Protocol 1 clearly 
provides that this should be done in accordance with national law.
70
 The same opinion 
was expressed in Öneryildiz by Judge Mularoni in his partly dissenting opinion.
71
  
 Given the extreme circumstances in the case of Öneryildiz, it is likely that this 
affected the ECtHR in deciding in favour of the applicant, contrary to the later decision in 
Depalle.
72
 Although the ECtHR has compared facts in Article 8 environmental claims in 
order to ascertain whether environmental degradation was enough to interfere with the 
enjoyment of Article 8 rights, Article 1 of Protocol 1 did not require such an exercise. It 
seems unjustified that these two cases had different outcomes in relation to Article 1 of 
Protocol 1. This strengthens the assumption that there is a lack of uniformity in decision 
making, which impedes the adoption of a more even approach towards environmental 
challenges and human rights by the ECtHR.  
 Another criticism over the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is the fact that substantive 
rights were seen as dependent on the protection of procedural rights. This 
‘proceduralisation’ of the rights affected by environmental factors was seen as an effort 
directed at people’s empowerment in relation to environmental decision making, 
ultimately ensuring the protection of substantive rights to the environment (i.e. right to 
life and right to private and family life).
73
 This is identified as a flaw, since 
environmental protection requires the protection of procedural rights as well substantive 
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 Instead the ECtHR interpreted the procedural aspects to be a prerequisite to 
protecting substantive rights. The protection of procedural rights, should have been 
independent from a substantive right based claim.
75
 For example, whilst the protection of 
the right to receive information on environmental matters is considered pivotal to the 
protection of Article 8 and Article 2 rights, it should be protected, whether or not a 
natural disaster eventually occurs which could lead to further interferences with Articles 
8 and 2.   
 In general, the case-law of the ECtHR related to ‘environmental rights’ is unclear. 
The increase of environmental cases decided in ECtHR, did not lead to a more 
progressive approach by the ECtHR compared to the CJEU. The area might be clarified 
in case of an accession, given how the implementation of EU environmental law and the 
Aarhus Convention with the external control of the ECtHR might lead to better protected 
‘environmental rights’. In case the EU accedes the ECHR, individuals would be able to 
bring complaints before the ECtHR against EU institutions for failure to comply with the 
Aarhus Convention corresponding directives and EU environmental law, raising claims 
based on the provisions of the ECHR. This means, that the proposed protocol and the 
Aarhus Convention in relation to procedural rights would allow further clarity. 
 
The day after the accession for ‘environmental rights’ 
Whether falling under the jurisdiction of the ECHR or the EU Charter, issues of 
supremacy have to be examined; which court should be responsible for protecting human 
rights in Europe as well as which court is in the best position to deal with human rights 
interferences by environmentally challenging circumstances. The ECtHR has been a very 
efficient institution for human rights protection relying on the ECHR. The CJEU has 
traditionally dealt with environmental protection through EU law. The accession of the 
EU to the ECHR will allow individuals to bring applications before the ECtHR against 
EU Institutions. Eckes is positive over the good effects that this accession would have on 
the protection of human rights in Europe, contrary to other bleak suggestions over the 
potential complexity of the situation if this accession gets completed.
76
 
Currently any implementation of EU Law by ECHR contracting states, including 
EU environmental law has to comply with the provisions of the ECHR. At the moment, it 
is difficult to distinguish which domestic legislation derives directly from EU 
environmental law. But ratification of the ECHR requires that this implementation is 
compliant with human rights provisions. The potential accession of the EU to the ECHR 
will mean that implementation of EU Environmental Law will be compliant to the 
ECHR’s provisions on human rights and bound by the decisions of the ECtHR.  
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 When a matter does not relate to EU Law, then it is the Member States’ 
responsibility to ensure that they comply with their own obligations under human rights 
law.
77
 The report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, clarifies 
that commitments of Member States under the ECHR are independent of their 
commitment under EU Law.
78
 An application that raises human rights concerns over EU 
Law, will not be addressed towards the EU Institutions but towards the implementing 
Member State instead.          
The EU accession to the ECHR will have three benefits. The accession will allow 
the ECHR’s principles legally binding for the EU Institutions. This will mean that there 
would be a uniformity of human rights protection amongst the two courts. Secondly, 
although the Charter of Fundamental Rights protects human rights, the accession will 
allow for external supervision in the form of a judicial supervision over the EU and its 
institutions. Finally, and most importantly, the system of individual applications before 
the ECtHR will allow individuals to bring applications against the EU and its Institutions. 
  
Conclusion 
The ECtHR has decided cases bringing environmental concerns to the forefront of human 
rights protection, relying on the provisions of the ECHR and seeking inspiration from 
international instruments such as the Aarhus Convention. These cases were a 
manifestation of the interdependent relationship between environment protection and the 
enjoyment of fundamental human rights. These range from complaints over alleged 
human rights violations due to environmental degradation to alleged human rights 
interferences through the enforcement of environmental protection policies.
79
 On the 
other hand the CJEU has also decided cases raising environmental and human rights 
concerns. These cases are mostly based on the Aarhus Convention but there is evidence 
of an inability to balance these human rights considerations in light of the original 
economic role of the EU.  
Despite the delay in the developments relating to the potential accession of the 
EU to the ECHR by the CJEU opinion of the Draft Agreement for the Accession of the 
EU to the ECHR, the combined application of the Aarhus Convention with the ECHR, 
will serve the better protection of ‘environmental rights’. There will be a uniform 
protection of  procedural and substantive ‘environmental rights’ across Europe and more 
clarity over how a complainant can bring a claim for ‘environmental rights’ violations 
against the European Union Institutions and EU Member States. The general consensus 
amongst scholars is that the accession will benefit the uniform protection of human rights 
across Europe ‘[contributing] to the creation of a single legal space, putting in place the 
missing link in the European system of fundamental rights protection’.
80
 Taking 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 See for example Tătar, above n. 54 
80 Above n. 50 
 
 
advantage of the CJEU expertise in applying EU Environmental Law and the Aarhus 
Convention implementing directives, together with the now extensive experience of the 
ECtHR in deciding over environmentally related applications, the accession will 
ultimately allow a more transparent area around the protection of rights when affected by 
environmental challenges in Europe.  
